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Abstract 
 
The promotion of the rule of law has become an important dimension of the 
European Union’s relations towards its neighbourhood. The rule of law is, however, a 
complex and multifaceted notion and the EU’s rule of law promotion policy has 
often been criticised for being either inefficient or self-interested. This collection of 
short papers offers an analysis of various case studies using the analytical framework 
of structural foreign policy (SFP) developed by Stephan Keukeleire. It aims to 
promote an original analytical perspective on the EU’s foreign policy but also to 
critically test and further develop the SFP analytical framework. The contributions of 
this collection consist of the shortened version of students’ Master’s theses written at 
the College of Europe during the academic year 2011-2012 in the framework of the 
course “The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor” taught by Stephan Keukeleire, Chairholder 
of the TOTAL Chair of EU F oreign Policy in the Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies.  
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3. Promoting Justice Abroad: An Analysis of the EU’s Rule of Law Promotion 
in Ukraine as Structural Foreign Policy 
Daan Fonck 
 
Introduction 
Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the Rule of Law (RoL) has been facing 
extreme perils, struggling to leave behind 60 years of totalitarian rule, and muddling 
through a very unstable political pathway of post-Communist transformation. Eight 
years after the Orange Revolution hopeful signals seem more distant than ever. The 
controversial case of Yulia Tymoshenko has come to stand as a symbol for the 
continuous application of ‘selective justice’ by the Ukrainian political elite.  
In this essay, we aim to examine how committed the EU has been in fostering the RoL 
in Ukraine, the so-called ‘pioneer’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). By 
applying the structural foreign policy (SFP) framework, we focus on the outcomes of 
RoL promotion, thereby taking up an explicit ‘outside-in’ perspective. After updating 
the SFP conceptual framework, we shortly look at the EU’s approach to RoL 
promotion, before turning to the actual RoL reform record in Ukraine.   
 
Updating the Structural Foreign Policy Framework 
Operationalising the ‘Rule of Law’ and Defining the Independence of the Judiciary 
Definitions of the RoL vary according to contextual factors and from author to 
author;1 it is an ‘essentially contested concept’.2 Following Kaplan, we argue that 
any conceptualisation must purposefully serve the theoretical approach we apply,3 
that is, structural foreign policy. Against this background, the classic distinction made 
by Craig (among others) between formal and substantial RoL seems particularly 
relevant as it goes hand in hand with the distinction between conventional and 
structural foreign policy (see Introduction).4 A formal conception of the RoL 
essentially prescribes the separation of law from politics and the accompanying 
conditions ensuring that separation. A substantial definition, on the other hand, goes 
                                                          
1 A. Bedner, “An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law”, Hague Journal on the Rule of 
Law, vol. 2, no. 1, 2010, p. 48. 
2 R. Fallon, “‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse”, Columbia Law 
Review, vol. 97, no. 1, 2007, p. 6.  
3 A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science, San Francisco, 
Chandler, 1964, pp. 51-53.  
4 P. Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework”, Public Law, vol. 20, no. 4, 1997, pp. 467-487. 
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beyond these procedural or formal aspects, and implies in particular that rights and 
liberties are guaranteed. It means that the RoL is internalised as a p ermanent 
organising principle for attaining justice.  
The independent judiciary system is the primary guardian or controlling mechanism 
of the RoL.5 Both policy-makers as well as academics generally follow the mantra 
that judicial independence protects and enhances the RoL, and that its viability is 
enhanced in a democratic environment. We claim that a strong distinction between 
de jure and de facto independence of the judiciary should be made and that the 
very independence of the judiciary can only be assessed by looking at its outcome. 
From the citizen’s point of view, an independent judiciary system translates essentially 
in the right to a fair trial. This implies aspects such as a reasonable procedural period, 
‘access to justice’, an impartial prosecutor, and the effective implementation of 
judicial decisions. In our analysis, we will adopt a substantial perspective towards 
judicial independence that enables us to ‘check’ the actual internalisation of the 
RoL, looking beyond de jure independence. 
 
Rule of Law Promotion as Structural Foreign Policy 
Table 1 displays a typology of RoL promotion conceptualised as SFP. Rather than a 
strict theoretical model, the table aims to illustrate the operationalisation of the SFP 
framework for the EU’s promotion of an independent judiciary. 
Table 1: Updated Typology – Dominant vs. Neglected Dimensions of Foreign Policy 
 Conventional RoL Promotion    Structural RoL Promotion 
Actors states   non-state actors: EU, civil 
society, NGOs 
Interests and 
objectives 
self-regarding interests: 
Justice and Home Affairs 
agenda 
collective interests other-regarding interests: 
Judicial Independence 
Security territorial security and stability   collective and human security 
Power and 
capabilities 
material and hard power    immaterial and soft power  
Means  hierarchy, no ownership, 
exclusive, unilateral 
  horizontal relationship, local 
ownership, inclusiveness 
Focus procedural RoL promotion   substantive RoL promotion 
Policy 
Indicators 
strengthening executive law 
enforcement, procuration, 
JHA externalisation  
strengthening 
administrative capacity 
strengthening judicial 
independence, access to 
justice 
Source: compiled by the author. 
                                                          
5 Bedner, op.cit., p. 67. 
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This typology represents a continuum rather than a clear distinction and that both 
categories are complementary rather than exclusionary. The ‘policy indicators’ give 
us an idea of what type of RoL promotion policies correspond to both dimensions. 
The interests and security dimensions need further explanation. 
Interests and Objectives 
In terms of interests, reference is made to George and Keohane’s concepts of self-
regarding interests, collective interests, and other-regarding interests.6 As for the 
objectives, we use the distinction made by Cremona7 and Wichmann8, who split up 
the external dimension of the EU’s fundamental values – such as the RoL – in 
constitutive and instrumentalist interpretations. Following the former, the promotion of 
the RoL is an objective in its own right as it reflects the promotion of internal values 
that constitute the Union’s own identity. According to the latter, the RoL agenda 
serves other foreign policy goals related to (self-interested) economic or security and 
stability interests. 
Security 
The policy issues of migration, terrorism and cross-border crime show that internal and 
external security dimensions are intertwined. Consequently, the EU’s self-interested 
security interests of RoL promotion take place in the European neighbourhood 
through the so-called external dimension of the Justice and Home Affairs (ED-JHA) 
policies.9 This ‘conventional’ promotion of the RoL, or rather of ‘rule and order’, is 
clearly self-interested since it explicitly aims to ensure internal stability and security 
through foreign policy. A ‘structural’ RoL promotion, on the contrary, implies the 
promotion of security for the individual against arbitrariness of the state and 
guarantees legal certainty.  
However, strengthening conventional security could also be structural, as it provides 
the necessary ‘security umbrella’ in which the RoL can develop in a structural way. 
Indeed, it is only by strengthening the executive law enforcement (making sure that 
                                                          
6 A.L. George & R.O. Keohane, “The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations”, in 
A.L. George (ed.), Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of 
Information and Advice, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 221, 230.   
7 M. Cremona, “Values in the EU Constitution: the External Dimension”, Working Paper, no. 26, 
CDDRL, Stanford Institute for International Studies, November 2004.     
8 N. Wichmann, Rule of Law Promotion in the European Neighbourhood Policy: Normative or 
Strategic Power Europe?, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2010, pp. 15-37.  
9 See T. Balzacq, The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, 
Neighbours, Security, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.  
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criminals are arrested and effectively prosecuted by the procuration) that the acts of 
an independent judiciary can have their merit. 
 
Measuring Internalisation: ‘Layers of Impact’ 
A final update to the SFP framework is the qualification of the degree of ‘internalisa-
tion’ of the RoL. In order not to limit ourselves to legal and institutional change, but to 
include behavioural change, we take over the ‘layers of impact’ model designed by 
Morlino and Magen as a guideline for our empirical analysis.10 The model 
differentiates between three ‘layers’ of impact an external actor can have on the 
domestic level: Rule Adoption (RA), meaning the transposition of rules, standards and 
norms into domestic legislation; Rule Implementation (RImp), or the transformation of 
governing institutions and administrative structures that need to implement changes; 
and finally, Rule Internalisation (RInt), which is the very acceptance of the transferred 
rules by the elite as well as the population. The instigation of this chain of impact is 
dependent on a credible commitment of the international actor (EU) on the one 
hand, and on political will of change agents within the target country (Ukraine) on 
the other hand. Moreover, a shift in the cost-benefit analysis in favour of the 
promoted rules and institutions is needed to make decision-makers opt for RA.  
Figure 1 below displays an updated SFP matrix, indicating the sectors and levels this 
essay will concentrate on, extended with the three layers of impact model.  
                                                          
10 L. Morlino & A. Magen, “Methods of influence, layers of impact, cycles of change”, in A. 
Magen & L. Morlino (eds.), International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: 
Anchoring Democracy?, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009, pp. 39-50. The model is simplified.  
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Figure 1: Updated Structural Foreign Policy Matrix 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
Inside-out: Is the EU’s Promotion of Rule of Law à la carte?  
When the EU p romotes RoL in Ukraine, does it follow a conventional or rather a 
structural foreign policy approach? Does the ‘constitutive’ or the ‘instrumentalist’ RoL 
promotion objectives prevail? The analysis of the relevant EU p rogramming 
documents for Ukraine show that the EU’s approach depends both on the policy 
field and the policy framework.11 
 
The ENP: Between ‘Constitutive’ Values and Self-Regarding Interests 
The relevant ENP programming documents12 predominantly maintain a ‘constitutive’ 
vision on the RoL: it is promoted as an objective in its own right. However, the reform 
of the judiciary is also often mentioned as an instrument for addressing (self-
interested) ‘security concerns’ such as terrorism, organised crime, trafficking in drugs 
and arms, as well as an instrument to strengthen cooperation in migration and 
asylum. Very recently, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the RoL promotion 
agenda has become much more ‘substantial’ as it aims to build ‘deep democracy’, 
where “the rule of law [is] administered by an independent judiciary and right to a 
                                                          
11 Wichmann, op.cit., pp. 52-85.  
12 These are the general neighbourhood strategy papers, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, the EU-
Ukraine Association Agenda, the Country Strategy Papers, and the National Indicative 
Programmes. 
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fair trial”.13 Nevertheless, the state-focused and institutionalist bias of policy interven-
tions is heavily present and thus “undermines the milieu goal character”.14 
 
The ‘Developmental’ Approach of the EIDHR 
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a thematic 
instrument aimed at providing support for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights. The EIDHR adopts a d evelopmental approach since it works exclusively 
through civil society organisations active in the promotion of these values.15 There-
fore, the degree of inclusiveness and local ownership is high. EIDHR clearly promotes 
the RoL as a ‘ constitutive’ value by stressing the independence of the judiciary in 
terms of equality before the law and access to justice.16  
 
The JHA Agenda: ‘Instrumental’ Means for Self-Regarding Interests 
The ED-JHA is by nature a self-interested policy, which makes the RoL promotion an 
‘instrumental’ objective. Within this policy field, the strengthening of the judiciary is 
consistently set out in terms of efficiency as it is needed to complement the EU’s 
internal security agenda for fighting crime and terrorism.17 The interaction between 
the EU and Ukraine is organised on an intergovernmental level through political 
dialogue and maintains a conditionality-like or rational ‘cost-benefit’ methodology.  
 
An Outside-in Perspective on Rule of Law Promotion in Ukraine 
The State of the RoL in post-Soviet Ukraine 
Within the Soviet system, political, legal, economic and ideological powers were 
fused and monopolised by the communist party. The politico-legal paradigm of 
‘socialist legality’ served to protect this system and stood in direct contrast with the 
‘capitalist’ principle of the RoL. It made the law a subservient institution to sustain the 
                                                          
13 Commission of the European Communities & High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: A 
New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303, 25 May 2011, p. 3.    
14 Wichmann, op.cit., p. 63.   
15 Directorate-General Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, “The European 
Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights”, 17 February 2012.  
16 Wichmann, op.cit., pp. 71-72.  
17 Ibid., p. 176. 
Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
27 
regime and to direct a political course.18 Therefore, Ukraine’s transition towards a 
democratic regime faces three main challenges as far as the establishment of a fully 
independent judiciary guarding the separation of powers is concerned.    
Firstly, the judicial branch is still underdeveloped. Interestingly, the politics of ‘rule by 
law’ in the Soviet system provided a frame of stability, structure and discipline for the 
judicial system and gave it the means to create and shape order in society (albeit in 
a dictatorial way). The collapse of the Soviet regime resulted in a ‘legal vacuum’ 
with no Ukrainian legal traditions and institutions to fill up the gap. The disappear-
ance of this top-down system meant that the judiciary could not rely anymore on the 
executive power which previously guaranteed its institutional capacity.19 The training 
of judges needs to be adapted to modern standards so as to set up a s ystem in 
which the decision for selection or promotion of judges is based on merit and 
competence and no longer on political loyalty. 20  
Secondly, within the executive branch, the old instinct remains as if the judicial 
apparatus was part of a unified state structure and in fact an instrument of 
government policy.21 This applies particularly to the prosecutor-general’s office 
which was during Soviet times the most important supportive institution of the 
Communist Party.22   
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, there is a need to overcome an old legal 
culture, where the law is no longer being thought of as the ‘will of the rulers’, but as 
the ‘will of the people’. This change is needed in the minds of the elite as much as in 
that of the citizens, since the law derives its legitimacy and enforcement mainly 
through voluntary compliance.23  
In short, the collapse of the Soviet-Union was anything but a simple and strict legal 
problem for the RoL and the judiciary. There is a n eed for a simultaneous and 
comprehensive shift in political, legal and societal sectors, at individual, societal, 
                                                          
18 H. Oda, “The Emergence of Pravovoe Gosudarstvo (Rechtsstaat) in Russia”, Review of 
Central and East European Law, vol. 25, no. 3, 1999, pp. 373-374. 
19 Interview with Arkadiy Bushchenko, executive director of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human 
Rights Union, Kiev, 27 March, 2012.  
20 K. Hendley, Trying to Make Law Matter: Legal Reform and Labor Law in the Soviet Union, 
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. 124.  
21 P. D’Anieri, “What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of the 
Orange Revolution”, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 5, 2005, p. 90. 
22 K. Malfliet, De geest van het russische recht, Leuven, Acco, 2010, p. 80. 
23 K. Ratushny, “Toward the ‘independence… of judges’ in Ukraine?”, Saskatchewan Law 
Review, vol. 62, 1999, p. 583. 
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professional and elite levels (police and civil servants, the parliament, businessmen, 
law schools, judges, and ordinary citizens), indicating a collective action problem. 
The old habit of political interference in the judicial branch needs to be broken. At 
the same time, the judicial sector needs institution- and capacity-building. Moreover, 
these changes can only sustain for as long as they are accompanied by a 
simultaneous change of legal culture.  
 
Two Decades of Justice Reform in Ukraine: Neglecting the Political Sector  
In this final part we investigate to which extent the EU’s RoL promotion activities have 
led to structural outcomes. We make use of the analytical framework and adjacent 
concepts of RA, RImp, and RInt so as to illustrate the degree of ‘internalisation’ of RoL 
promotion.  
Until 2004, Ukraine’s commitment to the independent judiciary was very weak, and 
EU-Ukraine relations were in general quite cold under President Kuchma (1994-2004). 
As in the 1990s the EU predominantly focused on the preparation of the Central and 
Eastern European countries for their accession to the EU, the Council of Europe was 
the major external actor promoting judicial reform in Ukraine. It was partly because 
of the latter’s extensive pressure that some ‘small justice reforms’ were adopted in 
2002. Relations with Kuchma stagnated during his second term when he pursued an 
increasingly authoritarian rule. On a judicial level, it meant there was almost no 
progress, since the oligarchic clans that came to organise themselves around 
Kuchma captured the courts. As a consequence, he vetoed many draft laws on 
strengthening judicial independence.24 Soviet practices remained recurrent as the 
judiciary was often treated as being part of the civil service and continuously 
received instructions.25  
From Kuchma’s rule onwards, EU-Ukraine relations also became complicated by the 
‘membership issue’. Both sides were no longer on the same wave length, Kiev was 
waiting for a clear membership commitment from Brussels to encourage reform, 
whereas Brussels demanded an improvement of Ukraine’s record of reform before 
                                                          
24 T. Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, 2006, 
p. 89.  
24 D’Anieri, op.cit., p. 90. 
25 H. van Zon, “Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism Under Leonid Kuchma”, Problems of 
Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 5, 2005, p. 16. 
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opening the door of accession.26 Knowing that the first phase of ‘Rule Adoption’ (RA) 
is dependent on both credible commitment of the EU a nd the political will of the 
Ukrainian political elite, it is therefore clear that all three phases of RA, RImp, and RInt 
were unthinkable until 2004. 
This started to change slightly in 2004 when the EU launched the ENP and things 
evolved in Kiev. The Orange Revolution brought a pro-EU and pro-democratic 
government to power. This period was of great significance for the independence of 
the judiciary. As many millions took the streets to protest against the fraudulent 
elections, the Supreme Court found the courage to nullify the second round of the 
presidential elections. All sides in the dispute, as well as the citizens, accepted the 
independent role of the Court.27 However, soon it became clear that, despite 
glorifying words of democratic change, practices of politicisation of the judicial 
system persisted and reforms were not implemented. Within society, feelings of hope 
were soon replaced by feelings of disillusionment and cynicism.  
Nevertheless, under the pressure of the EU and the Council of Europe, some initial RA 
was triggered. In November 2005, a Decree of President Yushchenko set up a 
‘National Commission on Strengthening Democracy and Rule of Law’. This resulted a 
year later in the approval of a ‘Strategy Plan for improving the justice system to 
ensure the right to a fair trial’ and the draft ‘Law on the Reform of the Judiciary’. Yet, 
notwithstanding continuous promises, the president and parliament did not succeed 
in adopting any final legislation. Especially in areas of political corruption or abuse of 
office, no progress was made, resulting in a continued selective or arbitrary attitude 
towards the law.28 Judicial independence reached an all-time low during the 2007 
Constitutional Crisis, when President Yushchenko fired several judges of the Constitu-
tional Court, who wanted to annul his decision to dissolve the parliament.29 
With the election of Yanukovych in 2010, the political will on Ukrainian side further 
decreased when the new president slowed down the European integration course. 
However, the Rada did adopt the long-prepared ‘Law on the Judiciary and the 
Status of Judges’.30 The Yanukovych administration largely took over the existing 
concept law, yet excluded essential provisions or amended others, which distorted 
                                                          
26 Kuzio, op.cit., p. 92. 
27 D’Anieri, op.cit., p. 90. 
28 Ibid. 
29 A. Trochev, “Meddling with Justice: Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted Courts in 
Post-Orange Ukraine”, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 18, no. 2, 2010, pp. 134-135. 
30 B. Futey, “Law on the judiciary and the status of judges in Ukraine”, US-Ukraine Foundation, 
Commentary, 14 October 2010.  
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its whole strength. In fact, it was clearly an intent to facilitate pressure on the 
judiciary.31 In short, whereas the 2010 legislation on the judiciary finally signalled the 
initiation of effective RA in justice reform, it is clear that the government tried to 
maintain, if not increase, its de facto influence on the courts. Thus far no serious 
phases of RImp, let alone RInt, have taken place in the judicial sector.  
It is clear that the continuous politically unstable climate is to a l arge extent an 
obstacle for serious reforms of the judiciary. Trochev argues that the EU, just as many 
other Western aid providers, was misled by the post-Orange leadership. They 
became entrapped in their ‘narrow’ judicial sector support.32 Ukraine is no stand-
alone case in which international RoL aid providers become ‘entrapped’ in their 
strong institutional fixation. An often-cited problem considers the programmes that 
provide computers and software to improve the efficiency of case management. 
These systems can be manipulated, so that the improved speed of case assignment 
might aggravate rather than improve the independence of the judiciary.33 Similar 
observations by RoL promoters in Ukraine were made where computerised case 
assignment software could be manually bypassed to assign a judge to a case.34 A 
second example is the setting up of semi-autonomous judicial councils in the 
selection and appointment process of judges. In Ukraine, this ‘High Council of 
Justice’ is strongly populated by executive and parliamentary representatives and 
has in fact become one of the main levers through which both branches try to 
influence judges.35 Without tackling the political sector, trying to build judicial 
independence through institutions is like trying to dry out a flooded room without 
turning off the taps: “the underlying maladies of the original institutions end up 
crossing over and infecting the new institutions”36. 
 
Conclusion 
The EU’s conception of RoL promotion is rather dependent on the goal it is serving: in 
a JHA context, the RoL takes the form of an instrument serving security concerns, 
whereas in the ENP framework, the RoL and independence of the judiciary is 
presented more as a constitutive value or as a goal in itself.  
                                                          
31 Interview with Arakdiy Bushchenko, op.cit. 
32 Trochev, op.cit., p. 128. 
33 T. Carothers, “Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge”, Working 
Paper No. 34, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2003, p. 10. 
34 M. Zimmer, “Courts flout case selection law for judges”, KyivPost, 1 March 2012. 
35 Interview with N. Vereshchinska, Director of the Centre of Judicial Studies, Kiev, 27 March 
2012.  
36 Carothers, op.cit., p. 11.  
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The EU’s structural RoL promotion is, however, limited to the first phase of rule 
adoption, far from the phases of actual internalisation. This indicates a lack of 
political will on the Ukrainian side as well as a lack of credible commitment of the EU. 
A study of the Ramzukov Centre on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan indeed confirms that despite some considerable success in certain sectors, the 
judicial branch and corruption remained one of the most problematic areas, 
requiring the strongest political capital.37  
The main activity of the EU is still based on political dialogue with the government as 
main contact.38 This ‘conventional’ RoL promotion, with a preference for top-down 
programmes where governments – instead of the civil society – are the principal 
partners, neglect the fact that this approach is not the most efficient. In that sense, 
our case further confirms Goldston’s general observation that there exists some 
general negligence by RoL donors that ‘partner’ governments can sometimes be 
the very obstacle to reform.39 
The EU’s RoL promotion lacks a ‘comprehensive’ approach. It looks at the institution 
of ‘law’ in a narrow, institutionalist and instrumentalist way. Judicial reform 
programmes were not tackling the political sector, where continued ‘selective use of 
justice’ is the main cause for judicial dependence. Therefore, judicial support 
initiatives risk being inefficient since the problem of political capture has not been 
overcome. This limitation is of course inherent to the limited ambition of the ENP. As it 
tries to organise intense external relationships with neighbours, but offers no 
membership prospects, the EU has no real leverage to address this political 
dimension. Although the EU helped to foster the maturation of the judicial sector, the 
observed collective action problem of judicial independence teaches us that no 
real improvement is to be expected as long as the political elite cannot be brought 
to respect the RoL. 
   
                                                          
37 Ramzukov Centre, Ukraine-EU: From the Action Plan to an Enhance Agreement, op.cit., pp. 
146-172. 
38 Interview with operational expert at the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, Kiev, 
29 March 2012. 
39 Goldston, James, “The Rule of Law at Home and Abroad”, Hague Journal of the Rule of 
Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2009, pp. 41-42. 
